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Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War 
JAMES D. FEARON and DAVID D. LAITIN Stanford University 
An influential conventional wisdom holds that civil wars proliferated rapidly with the end of 
the Cold War and that the root cause of many or most of these has been ethnic and religious 
antagonisms. We show that the current prevalence of internal war is mainly the result of a steady 
accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s rather than a sudden change associated 
with a new, post-Cold War international system. We also find that after controlling for per capita income, 
more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil 
violence in this period. We argue for understanding civil war in this period in terms of insurgency or 
rural guerrilla warfare, a particular form of military practice that can be harnessed to diverse political 
agendas. The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or 
religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency. These include poverty-which 
marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment-political instability, 
rough terrain, and large populations. 
B etween 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle 
deaths occurred in the 25 interstate wars that 
killed at least 1,000 and had at least 100 dead 
on each side. These wars involved just 25 states that 
suffered casualties of at least 1,000 and had a median 
duration of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same 
period there were roughly 127 civil wars that killed at 
least 1,000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A con- 
servative estimate of the total dead as a direct result of 
these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate 
toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 states-more than a 
third of the United Nations system-and had a median 
duration of roughly six years.1 The civil conflicts in this 
period surely produced refugee flows far greater than 
their death toll and far greater than the refugee flows 
associated with interstate wars since 1945. Cases such 
as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon testify to the 
economic devastation that civil wars can produce. By 
these crude measures, civil war has been a far greater 
scourge than interstate war in this period, though it has 
been studied far less. 
What explains the recent prevalence of violent civil 
conflict around the world? Is it due to the end of the 
Cold War and associated changes in the international 
system, or is it the result of longer-term trends? Why 
have some countries had civil wars while others have 
not? and Why did the wars break out when they did? 
We address these questions using data for the period 
1945 to 1999 on the 161 countries that had a population 
of at least half a million in 1990. 
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The data cast doubt on three influential conventional 
wisdoms concerning political conflict before and after 
the Cold War. First, contrary to common opinion, the 
prevalence of civil war in the 1990s was not due to the 
end of the Cold War and associated changes in the inter- 
national system. The current level of about one in 
six countries had already been reached prior to the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and resulted from a steady, 
gradual accumulation of civil conflicts that began im- 
mediately after World War II. 
Second, it appears not to be true that a greater degree 
of ethnic or religious diversity-or indeed any partic- 
ular cultural demography-by itself makes a country 
more prone to civil war. This finding runs contrary to 
a common view among journalists, policy makers, and 
academics, which holds "plural" societies to be espe- 
cially conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious tensions 
and antagonisms. 
Third, we find little evidence that one can predict 
where a civil war will break out by looking for where 
ethnic or other broad political grievances are strongest. 
Were this so, one would expect political democracies 
and states that observe civil liberties to be less civil 
war-prone than dictatorships. One would further antici- 
pate that state discrimination against minority religions 
or languages would imply higher risks of civil war. We 
show that when comparing states at similar levels of per 
capita income, these expectations are not borne out. 
The main factors determining both the secular trend 
and the cross-sectional variation in civil violence in this 
period are not ethnic or religious differences or broadly 
held grievances but, rather, conditions that favor insur- 
gency. Insurgency is a technology of military conflict 
characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing 
guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. As a form of 
warfare insurgency can be harnessed to diverse politi- 
cal agendas, motivations, and grievances. The concept is 
most closely associated with communist insurgency, but 
the methods have equally served Islamic fundamental- 
ists, ethnic nationalists, or "rebels" who focus mainly 
on traffic in coca or diamonds. 
We hypothesize that financially, organizationally, and 
politically weak central governments render insur- 
gency more feasible and attractive due to weak local 
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policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency prac- 
tices. These often include a propensity for brutal and 
indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive noncombat- 
ant locals into rebel forces. Police and counterinsurgent 
weakness, we argue, is proxied by a low per capita in- 
come. Shocks to counterinsurgent capabilities can arise 
from political instability at the center or the sudden 
loss of a foreign patron. On the rebel side, insurgency 
is favored by rough terrain, rebels with local knowl- 
edge of the population superior to the government's, 
and a large population. All three aid rebels in hiding 
from superior government forces. Foreign base camps, 
financial support, and training also favor insurgency. 
Our data show that measures of cultural diversity and 
grievances fail to postdict civil war onset, while mea- 
sures of conditions that favor insurgency do fairly well. 
Surely ethnic antagonisms, nationalist sentiments, and 
grievances often motivate rebels and their supporters. 
But such broad factors are too common to distinguish 
the cases where civil war breaks out. Also, because in- 
surgency can be successfully practiced by small num- 
bers of rebels under the right conditions, civil war may 
require only a small number with intense grievances to 
get going. 
Using data on about 45 civil wars since 1960, Collier 
and Hoeffler (1999, 2001) find similarly that measures 
of "objective grievance" fare worse as predictors than 
economic variables, which they initially interpreted as 
measures of rebel "greed" (i.e., economic motivation).2 
More recently, they argue that rebellion is better 
explained by "opportunity" than by grievance (cf. 
Eisinger 1973 and Tilly 1978) and that the main de- 
terminant of opportunity is the availability of finance 
and recruits for rebels. They proxy these with measures 
of primary commodity exports and rates of secondary- 
school enrollment for males. We agree that financing 
is one determinant of the viability of insurgency. We 
argue, however, that economic variables such as per 
capita income matter primarily because they proxy 
for state administrative, military, and police capabil- 
ities. We find no impact for primary commodity ex- 
ports, and none for secondary schooling rates distinct 
from income. Our theoretical interpretation is more 
Hobbesian than economic. Where states are relatively 
weak and capricious, both fears and opportunities en- 
courage the rise of would-be rulers who supply a rough 
local justice while arrogating the power to "tax" for 
themselves and, often, for a larger cause. 
CIVIL WAR SINCE 1945 
Building on similar efforts by other civil war resear- 
chers,3 we constructed a list of violent civil conflicts 
2 There are 79 wars in their sample, but they lose about 34 due to 
missing values on explanatory variables, which are mainly economic. 
Standard economic data tend to be missing for countries that are 
poor and civil war-torn. This highly nonrandom listwise deletion may 
account for some of the differences between our results. 
3 In particular, Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Esty et al. (1998), 
Gleditsch et al. (2002), the Institute for International and Strate- 
gic Studies (2000), Licklider (1995), Singer and Small (1994), Sivard 
(1996), and Valentino (2002). 
that we presently believe to meet the following primary 
criteria. (1) They involved fighting between agents of 
(or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups 
who sought either to take control of a government, to 
take power in a region, or to use violence to change gov- 
ernment policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 
over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. 
(3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including 
civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is in- 
tended to rule out massacres where there is no orga- 
nized or effective opposition.4 
These criteria are broadly similar to those stated 
by the Correlates of War (COW) project, Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000), and several others. We developed our 
own list (working from these and other sources) mainly 
because we wanted data for the whole 1945-99 period 
and because of doubts about particular inclusions and 
exclusions in each list.5 
In one respect our data differ significantly from most 
others: We see no reason in principle to exclude anti- 
colonial wars, such as the French versus the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. We count these as 
occuring within the colonial empire. Thus, the French 
state/empire looks highly civil war-prone by our list, 
with six colonial wars occuring in the 1950s. But 
to drop such cases would be like dropping the cur- 
rent conflict in Chechnya as a civil war in Russia 
if the Chechens succeed in gaining independence. Al- 
ternatively, it would make even less sense to include 
them as wars within "states" that did not exist (such as 
"Algeria" in 1954). 
There are both practical and theoretical consider- 
ations pointing the other way, however. In practical 
terms, to include the anticolonial wars in the analysis 
requires that we form estimates of possible explana- 
tory factors for whole empires, such as gross domes- 
tic product (GDP) per capita, ethnic fractionalization, 
and democracy scores. Further, these estimates must 
change almost by year, as the colonial empires gradu- 
ally diminished in size. We are able to use country-level 
data to produce such estimates for ethnic fractionaliza- 
tion, but our estimates for per capita income are more 
4 We used the following secondary criteria to deal with several other 
coding issues. (4) The start year is the first year in which 100 were 
killed or in which a violent event occurred that was followed by a 
sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria. (5) If a 
main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the 
fighting continues (e.g., Somalia gets a new civil war after Siad Barre is 
defeated in 1991). (6) War ends are coded by observation of a victory, 
wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at 
least two years of peace. (7) Involvement by foreign troops does not 
disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are 
satisfied. (8) We code multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel 
groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent central state 
on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination. (9) If a state 
seeks to incorporate and govern territory that is not a recognized 
state, we consider it a "civil war" only if the fighting continues after 
the state begins to govern the territory (thus, Indonesia/East Timor 
1975, yes, and India/Hyderabad 1947, no). 5 Sambanis (2002) discusses a number of conceptual and operational 
ambiguities and problems with the COW civil war data. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2001) base their list on COW data, breaking a number of 
COW civil wars into multiple wars according to unspecified criteria 
and including some colonial wars (coded in nonexistent "states," such 
as Angola 1961) but not others. 
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FIGURE 1. Number and Percentage of Countries with Ongoing Civil Wars by Year from 1945 to 1999 
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problematic and the question of how to code the em- 
pires on a democracy index is vexed. Regarding theory, 
the colonial empires differed so radically from other 
independent states, and faced such an inhospitable in- 
ternational environment after the war (with pressure 
from the United States and the new United Nations 
system), that we need to be cautious about any empir- 
ical results that depend wholly on these cases. Thus we 
analyze the data both with and without the anticolonial 
wars. 
Descriptive Statistics 
We identified 127 conflicts that meet the above criteria, 
of which 13 were anticolonial wars.6 This makes for 127 
civil war starts in a sample of 6,610 country years, a rate 
of 1.92 per 100. The periods following major interna- 
tional systemic change had the highest onset rates. Civil 
wars broke out in the late 1940s and the 1950s at 4.6 and 
2.2 per 100 country-years, respectively, followed by the 
1990s, at 2.0. In absolute terms, the largest number of 
civil wars began in the 1990s (31), followed by the 1960s 
and 1970s (19 and 25, respectively). 
Omitting the anticolonial conflicts, most civil wars 
occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (34) and Asia (33), 
followed by North Africa/the Middle East (17), Latin 
America (15), Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union (13), and "the West" (2). The rate of outbreak 
was highest in Asia, at three per 100 country-years; 
Africa, North Africa/the Middle East, and Latin 
America all had rates of about two per 100 country- 
years. "France," Indonesia, and the Soviet Union/ 
6 See Fearon and Laitin 2003 for a list of the conflicts. 
Russia are the 
sample, with six 
most civil war-prone countries in the 
onsets each.7 
Trends over Time 
Figure 1 shows the number of countries with ongoing 
civil wars by year from 1945 to 1999. Since the number 
of independent states grew sharply in this period, it 
also shows the proportion of countries with at least one 
ongoing war in each year. 
The graph indicates that, contrary to popular belief, 
the prevalence of civil wars in the 1990s is not due 
to effects of the end of the Cold War. The 1999 level 
of 25 ongoing wars had already been reached by the 
mid 1980s. Conflicts associated with the Soviet collapse 
were partly responsible for the sharp increase in the 
early 1990s, but a marked decline has followed.8 
One might conjecture that more and more civil wars 
are breaking out over time, thus producing the secu- 
lar increase. This is incorrect. The rate of outbreak is 
2.31 per year since 1945, highly variable but showing 
no significant trend up or down. The secular increase 
stems from the fact that civil wars have ended at a 
rate of only about 1.85 per year. The result has been a 
steady, almost-linear accumulation of unresolved con- 
flicts since 1945. 
Put differently, states in the international system 
have been subject to a more or less constant risk 
7 Four outbreaks are coded in the Soviet Union in 1946, in the Baltics 
and Ukraine, plus Russia's two Chechen wars in the 1990s. 8 Gurr (2000) notes the late-1990s decline in ethnic war and argues 
that the trend reflects improved management strategies by states and 
international organizations. The basic pattern in Figure 1 is not an 
artifact of the way we have coded "civil war"; it is observed in a broad 
range of other data sets on violent domestic conflict for this period 
(e.g., Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
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of violent civil conflict over the period, but the con- 
flicts they suffer have been difficult to end. The aver- 
age duration of the civil wars in progress has increased 
steadily from two years in 1947 to about 15 years 
in 1999. From a policy perspective this suggests cau- 
tion about seeing as a temporary "blip" the sorts of 
military and political problems Western foreign policy 
makers have faced recently in Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Colombia, and 
elsewhere. 
ETHNICITY, DISCRIMINATION, 
AND GRIEVANCES 
During the Cold War, political scientists and sociolo- 
gists often sought to trace rebellion to economic in- 
equality (Muller 1985; Paige 1975; Russett 1964), to 
rapid economic growth said to destabilize traditional 
rural social systems (Huntington 1968; Scott 1976), or 
to frustrations arising from the failure to gain expected 
benefits of economic modernization (Gurr 1971). A 
few scholars argued that the real source of rebellion 
was often ethnic nationalism (Connor 1994), and a rich 
literature on the sources nationalist mobilization de- 
veloped in comparative politics (e.g., Anderson 1983, 
Deutsch 1953, and Gellner 1983). With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, such culturalist 
perspectives became a dominant frame for interpreting 
inter- and intranational conflict (e.g., Huntington 1996). 
Using a broad brush, we can distinguish between 
perennialist and modernist (or constructivist) positions 
on the nature and sources of ethnic nationalism. Given 
in purest form by nationalist politicians and journalists 
reporting on nationalist conflicts in progress, perenni- 
alist arguments stress long-standing cultural practices 
said to define and distinguish ethnic groups. Differ- 
ences between these practices are argued to have made 
conflict more likely. Academics rarely make such ar- 
guments as baldly as do nationalist leaders. But au- 
thors who stress the long-standing, "deep" nature of 
ethnic differences and suggest that these make domes- 
tic peace difficult include Huntington (1996), Ignatieff 
(1993), Moynihan (1993), Rabushka and Shepsle 
(1972), and Smith (1986). Arguably, the main message 
of Horowitz's (1985) influential book on ethnic conflict 
is that plural societies face a host of pathologies that 
render them especially prone to conflict and, at the 
extreme, violence. 
In contrast, modernist theories see the thorough- 
going politicization of cultural difference that ethnic 
nationalism represents as a development of the last 200 
to 500 years. The core argument is that economic mod- 
ernization and the development of the modern state 
make upward social mobility possible, but contingent 
on sharing the culture of the group that dominates 
state or society. When the state or society poses ascrip- 
tive barriers to upward mobility for minority groups, 
they may develop separatist nationalist movements: All 
the more so, according to Anderson (1983), Deutsch 
(1953), and Gellner (1983), the greater the preexisting 
cultural differences between the minority group and 
the dominant group. (When preexisting differences are 
slight, assimilation is more likely.) 
The two approaches thus imply the same hypothesis 
about the relationship between cultural diversity and 
civil conflict. 
H1: Measures of a country's ethnic or religious di- 
versity should be associated with a higher risk of 
civil war. 
Seeking to explain anticolonial nationalist move- 
ments in countries barely affected by economic mod- 
ernization, Gellner (1983, 108, nl) argued that even 
"the advance shadow" of modernization was sufficient 
to start nationalist dynamics in motion. For Anderson, 
nationalism quickly became a "modular form" that 
could be easily "pirated," even under conditions quite 
different from those during its origination. Nonethe- 
less, if one took the modernist approach literally one 
might infer that more modernization should imply 
more discrimination and thus more nationalist con- 
tention in culturally divided countries. 
H2: The effect of ethnic diversity on the probability 
of civil war should increase at higher levels of per 
capita income (a proxy for economic moderniza- 
tion). 
Horowitz (1985) and several others argue that the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and severe ethnic 
conflict is nonmonotonic, with less violence for highly 
homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries. The 
politics of a highly diverse country might be strate- 
gically similar to those of a homogeneous one, since 
small ethnic groups must join coalitions to have political 
influence, and there are many possibilities for cross- 
cutting and shifts in coalition membership. Horowitz 
suggests that the most severe ethnic conflicts will arise 
in countries where a substantial ethnic minority faces 
an ethnic majority that can, given ethnic voting, win for 
sure in any national election. Such arguments yield the 
following hypothesis. 
H3: Countries with an ethnic majority and a sig- 
nificant ethnic minority are at greater risk for civil 
war. 
We consider several measures for these concepts. For 
H1 we use (1) the commonly employed ethnolinguis- 
tic fractionalization (ELF) index based on data from 
Atlas Narodov Mira 1964, which gives the probability 
that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are 
from different ethnolinguistic groups;9 (2) a measure 
of the share of population belonging to the largest eth- 
nic group that we constructed from the CIA Factbook 
and other sources (Fearon 2002); (3) the number of 
distinct languages spoken by groups exceeding 1% of 
9 For this and several other variables we filled in values for missing 
country years whenever possible based on our own research; often 
the sources were the CIA Factbook, Encyclopedia Brittanica, and 
the Library of Congress Country Studies, though we used country- 
specific sources when necessary. 
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the country's population, based on Grimes and Grimes 
1996; and (4) a measure of religious fractionalization 
(analogous to the ELF) that we constructed using data 
from the CIA Factbook and other sources. For H2 we 
interact these measures with per capita income. For 
H3, we use a dummy variable marking the 74 countries 
whose largest and second-largest ethnic groups exceed 
49% and 7% of the population, respectively.? 
The mechanism that gives rise to nationalist con- 
tention in modernist arguments is state or societal dis- 
crimination along the lines of cultural difference, which 
is thought to create the grievances that motivate re- 
bellions. Grievances are difficult to measure indepen- 
dently of our knowledge of the actions we are trying 
to explain (rebellions, civil war), but measures of aver- 
age levels of discrimination are feasible. Other things 
being equal, political democracy should be associated 
with less discrimination and repression along cultural 
or other lines, since democracy endows citizens with a 
political power (the vote) they do not have in dictator- 
ships. Even more directly, measures of state observance 
of civil rights such as freedom of association, expres- 
sion, and due process should be associated with less 
repression and thus lower grievances. State policies that 
discriminate in favor of a particular group's language 
or religion should be associated with greater minority 
grievances. Finally, it is often argued that greater eco- 
nomic inequality creates broad grievances that favor 
civil conflict (e.g., Muller 1985). Thus, we have the fol- 
lowing hypotheses. 
H4: Measures of political democracy and civil lib- 
erties should be associated with lower risks of civil 
war onset. 
H5: Policies that discriminate in favor of a partic- 
ular language or religion should raise the risk of 
civil war onset in states with religious or linguistic 
minorities. 
HS6: Greater income inequality should be associ- 
ated with higher risks of civil war onset. 
We consider both the Polity IV and the Przeworski 
et al. 2000 democracy measures, along with the Free- 
dom House indicator of the observance of civil 
liberties.11 For income inequality we interpolated and 
extended as necessary the Gini coefficients assembled 
10 Alternative thresholds for the second-largest group, such as 10%, 
make no difference in the results. 
11 Freedom House codes countries annually from 1972 on a seven- 
point scale based on a "checklist" that awards points for government 
observance of a long list of civil liberties and rule of law, including 
freedom of the press, religion, and association, independent judiciary, 
equal treatment under the law, civilian control of police, "protec- 
tion from political terror," secure property rights, and equality of 
opportunity. "Freedom from war and insurgency" is one element of 
their checklist, so we are careful to lag this independent variable. 
For Polity IV, we use the difference between the 11-point democracy 
and autocracy scales. Following the Polity coders' suggestions, we 
interpolate values for "transition period" years (-88), treat foreign 
occupation years (-66) as missing, and treat "interruptions" (-77) 
as zeros. See http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity/. 
by Deininger and Squire (1996); using the country- 
average of Gini values produced the same results. For 
policies on religion, we coded, by decade, indicators 
for whether the state had an official religion, gave re- 
sources to one religion not available to others, regu- 
lated missionary activities, required religious groups 
to get official approval for religious activities, or sin- 
gled out for or permitted harassment of a particular 
religious group. For policies on language, we coded by 
year whether a language spoken by at least 5% of the 
population received no official recognition at any level 
of government.12 
One might argue, contrary to H, above, that we 
should expect an association between measures of eth- 
nic diversity and the occurence of ethnic strife, but not 
between ethnic diversity and civil war more broadly. 
In the limit this argument borders on tautology, since 
it would not be surprising if ethnic wars are rare in 
countries whose citizens think of themselves as ethni- 
cally homogeneous. However, one might ask if "ethnic 
wars" become more likely as ethnic diversity increases 
among those countries that have at least one nontrivial 
ethnic minority. 
H7: Among countries with an ethnic minority com- 
prising at least 5% of the population, greater eth- 
nic diversity should associate with a higher risk of 
ethnic civil war. 
The measurement problem here is to say what an 
"ethnic" civil war is, and we suspect that under any 
plausible statement of the concept there will be numer- 
ous cases that are mixed or ambiguous. We coded as 
"ethnic" conflicts in which the fighters were mobilized 
primarily along ethnic lines, marking off 58 (51%) as 
ethnic, 20 (18%) as mixed or ambiguous, and 36 (32%) 
as not ethnic (excluding the anticolonial conflicts). 
INSURGENCY 
If many post-1945 civil wars have been "ethnic" or 
"nationalist" as these terms are usually understood, 
then even more have been fought as insurgencies. In- 
surgency is a technology of military conflict character- 
ized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla 
warfare from rural base areas. To explain why some 
countries have experienced civil wars in this period one 
needs to understand the conditions that favor insur- 
gency, which are largely independent of cultural dif- 
ferences between groups and even group grievances. 
These conditions are best summarized by way of a brief 
statement of the logic of insurgency.13 
The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insur- 
gents are weak relative to the governments they are 
12 
"Official recognition" implies use by some public, officially sanc- 
tioned entity. For language we relied mainly on Asher 1994 and 
Gunnemark 1992; and for religion, the U.S. State Department's 1999 
Annual Report on Religious Freedom. 
13 Though our formulations differ, we have been influenced here 
by Stathis Kalyvas's work on the Greek civil war. The literature on 
guerrilla warfare is extensive; see, for examples, Desai and Eckstein 
1990, Griffith 1961, and Laqueur 1976. 
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fighting, at least at the start of operations. If govern- 
ment forces knew who the rebels were and how to find 
them, they would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. 
This is true even in states whose military and police 
capacities are low. The total number of active rebels in 
many wars in which thousands of civilians have been 
killed (through the actions of both governments and 
rebels) is often in the hundreds or low thousands. 
The numerical weakness of the insurgents implies 
that, to survive, the rebels must be able to hide from 
government forces. Several hypotheses follow. 
H8: The presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly 
served by roads, at a distance from the centers 
of state power, should favor insurgency and civil 
war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, cross- 
border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that 
can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to 
government agents. 
Much scholarly writing holds that ethnic or class sol- 
idarity and grievances are necessary for Hc, the lo- 
cal population's support of active rebels. In line with 
Kriger (1992) and some analysts of communist insur- 
gencies (e.g., Clutterbuck 1967, Leites and Wolf 1970, 
and Thompson 1966), we argue that while grievances 
and ethnic solidarity can be helpful in this regard, they 
are not necessary. Instead, the key to inducing the lo- 
cal population not to denounce the active rebels is 
local knowledge, or information about who is doing 
what at the village level. Local knowledge allows the 
active rebels to threaten retribution for denunciation 
credibly.14 Ethnic insurgents use this informational ad- 
vantage to great effect, often threatening and inflicting 
unimaginably harsh sanctions on "their own" people 
(Kalyvas 1999; Kriger 1992). The presence of an eth- 
nic insurgency does not imply that the members of the 
ethnic group are of one mind in their determination to 
fight the state till they realize a nationalist dream. The 
immediate concern is how to survive in between gov- 
ernment forces using violence to gain information or 
punish alleged rebel supporters and rebel forces using 
violence to punish alleged informants, "moderates," or 
government sympathizers. 
An empirical implication of the importance of lo- 
cal knowledge is hypothesis Hsd: Having a rural base 
should greatly favor insurgency. In the city, anony- 
mous denunciation is easier to get away with, giving 
the government an advantage in its counterinsurgent 
efforts. 
Given the basic constraints posed by numerical 
weakness-the need to hide and not be denounced- 
various factors determine insurgents' ability to wage 
war. To survive, rebels need arms and materiel, money 
to buy them, or smugglable goods to trade for them. 
They need a supply of recruits to the insurgent way of 
14 A "second-order" mechanism by which ethnicity may favor insur- 
gency is that ethnic minorities are sometimes marked by dense social 
networks that are isolated from dominant group networks, thus giving 
an informational advantage to local rebels (Fearon and Laitin 1996). 
But such an advantage does not require ethnic distinctiveness. 
life, and they may also need information and instruction 
in the practical details of running an insurgency.15 
Most important for the prospects of a nascent insur- 
gency, however, are the government's police and military 
capabilities and the reach of government institutions into 
rural areas. Insurgents are better able to survive and 
prosper if the government and military they oppose 
are relatively weak-badly financed, organizationally 
inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed 
about goings-on at the local level. 
Effective counterinsurgency requires government 
forces to distinguish active rebels from noncombatants 
without destroying the lives and living conditions of the 
latter. This is an extremely difficult political, military, 
and organizational problem even for well-equipped 
and well-paid modern militaries; witness the U.S. mil- 
itary's failures in Vietnam (Avant 1994; Krepinevich 
1986), early British efforts in Northern Ireland 
(Kennedy-Pipe 1997), or Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. 
For less well-financed and bureaucratically competent 
states, the problem appears to be nearly insoluble. Such 
states either cannot prevent the abuse of local powers 
by field commanders or may even permit these abuses 
as a sort of tax farming to the military. That is, they 
"pay" the soldiers with the opportunity to loot and pil- 
lage, a practice that tends to sustain rather than end 
insurgencies (see Keen 1998 for examples). Thus, we 
have the following hypothesis. 
Hg: Proxies for the relative weakness or strength of 
the insurgents-their odds of being killed or cap- 
tured for a given level of counterinsurgent effort 
by the government-should be associated with the 
likelihood that a country develops a civil war. In 
particular, a higherper capita income should be as- 
sociated with a lower risk of civil war onset because 
(a) it is a proxy for a state's overall financial, ad- 
ministrative, police, and military capabilities, and 
(b) it will mark more developed countries with ter- 
rain more "disciplined" by roads and rural society 
more penetrated by central administration. 
There is an additional reason why a lower per capita 
income should favor the technology of insurgency: 
(c) Recruiting young men to the life of a guerrilla is eas- 
ier when the economic alternatives are worse. Though 
we try below, it is difficult to find measures to distinguish 
among these three mechanisms associating a low per 
capita income with civil war onset. We believe that the 
strong results for per capita income reported below are 
due largely to its acting as a proxy for state military and 
police strength relative to potential insurgents (a and b 
in H9). The fact that measures such as the percentage of 
young males and male secondary schooling rates pre- 
dict less well than per capita income is consistent with 
this conjecture, though not definitive. 
15 In the case literature one frequently finds either that rebels leaders 
have spent time at guerrilla training camps in, for example, Libya, 
Afghanistan, Lebanon, or Mozambique (in the 1970s) or that they 
gained guerrilla experience in one insurgency that they apply in pur- 
suing another. 
80 
Ethnicity, Insurgency, February  
American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1 
Additional factors that would be expected to affect 
(or proxy) the strength of an insurgent band relative to 
a state follow. 
H1o: The political and military technology of in- 
surgency will be favored, and thus civil war made 
more likely, when potential rebels face or have 
available the following. 
(a) A newly independent state, which suddenly 
loses the coercive backing of the former im- 
perial power and whose military capabilities 
are new and untested (Fearon 1998). 
(b) Political instability at the center, which may 
indicate disorganization and weakness and 
thus an opportunity for a separatist or center- 
seeking rebellion. 
(c) A regime that mixes democratic with auto- 
cratic features, as this is likely to indicate polit- 
ical contestation among competing forces and, 
in consequence, state incapacity. (In contrast, 
pure autocracy tends to reflect the successful 
monopolization of state coercive and adminis- 
trative power by an individual or group.) 
(d) A large country population, which makes it 
necessary for the center to multiply layers of 
agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the 
local level and, also, increases the number of 
potential recruits to an insurgency for a given 
level of income. 
(e) A territorial base separated from the state's 
center by water or distance-for example, 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West 
Pakistan or Angola from Portugal. 
(f) Foreign governments or diasporas willing to 
supply weapons, money, or training. 
(g) Land that supports the production of high- 
value, low-weight goods such as coca, opium, 
diamonds, and other contraband, which can be 
used to finance an insurgency. 
(h) A state whose revenues derive primarily from 
oil exports. Oil producers tend to have weaker 
state apparatuses than one would expect given 
their level of income because the rulers have 
less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate 
bureaucratic system to raise revenues-a po- 
litical "Dutch disease" (Chaudhry 1989; Karl 
1997; Wantchekon 2000). At the same time, 
oil revenues raise the value of the "prize" of 
controlling state power. 
Partially excepting f, none of these conditions cru- 
cially involves cultural differences, ethnic minority 
status, or group grievances. We do not claim that these 
factors provide no help to would-be insurgents in spe- 
cific cases. But, to reiterate, grievances and ethnic 
differences are too common to help distinguish the 
countries andy tat ee ii a nd ears hat s c vil w rs, a in any event 
the technology of insurgency does not require strong 
popular grievances or ethnic solidarities to operate ef- 
fectively. The latter point suggests a contrast to H4-Hk. 
H1l: After controlling for per capita income (or 
other measures of state strength), neither political 
democracy, the presence of civil liberties, higher in- 
come inequality, nor nondiscriminatory linguistic 
or religious policies should associate strongly with 
lower odds of civil war. Given the right environ- 
mental conditions, insurgencies can thrive on the 
basis of small numbers of rebels without strong, 
widespread, popular support rooted in grievances 
and, hence, even in democracies. 
As for measures, for "rough terrain" we use the pro- 
portion of the country that is "mountainous" according 
to the codings of geographer A. J. Gerard.16 This does 
not pick up other sorts of rough terrain that can be 
favorable to guerrillas such as swamps and jungle, and 
it takes no account of population distributions or food 
availability in relation to mountains; but it is the best we 
have been able to do for H8a. For H9 we use Penn World 
Tables and World Bank data on per capita income, es- 
timating missing values using data on per capita en- 
ergy consumption.17 For H1oa (new states) we mark 
countries in their first and second years of indepen- 
dence; for H1ob (political instability) we use a dummy 
variable indicating whether the country had a three-or- 
greater change on the Polity IV regime index in any of 
the three years prior to the country-year in question.18 
For countries that mix democratic and autocratic fea- 
tures (called "anocracies" or "semidemocracies" in 
the international relations literature and "praetorian 
regimes" by Huntington 1968) we mark regimes that 
score between -5 and 5 on the difference between 
Polity IV's democracy and autocracy measures (the 
difference ranges from -10 to 10). Country popula- 
tion (Hiod) is based largely on World Bank figures. For 
oil exporters we marked country-years in which fuel 
exports exceeded one-third of export revenues, using 
World Bank data.19 We coded a dummy variable for 
states with noncontiguous territory ourselves (H1ie).20 
16 Gerard produced this measure for the DECRG project on civil 
wars at the World Bank. Our sample of countries differs slightly, 
so we estimated values for 21 missing countries using the difference 
between the highest and the lowest point of elevation in each country, 
which is well correlated with the mountains measure (0.78 in logs). 
17 We used income growth rates from the World Development Indi- 
cators 2001 to extend the estimates in the Penn World Tables 5.6 and 
then used the per capita energy consumption estimates provided by 
the COW project to estimate additional missing values. For details 
see Fearon and Laitin 2003. 
18 For this variable, "transition periods" and "interruptions" (which 
indicate a "complete collapse of central authority") are coded as 
instability; foreign occupations are treated as missing. 
19 The data are for five-year intervals beginning in 1960; we inter- 
polated for years after 1960, set the value to that in 1960 for years 
prior to 1960, and used country-specific sources for a few countries 
without World Bank coverage. 
20 Countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and sep- 
arated from the land area containing the capital city either by land 
or by 100 km of water were coded as "noncontiguous." Ignoring the 
colonial empires, 25 of our 161 countries meet this criterion at some 
time since 1945. 
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The remaining hypotheses (Hsb-H8d, H1of and 
Hiog) present more difficult measurement challenges. 
Whether availability of a rural base favors civil war 
(HId) is better tested in a research design where ethnic 
groups are the unit of analysis, so that groups with dif- 
ferent geographic concentrations can be compared.21 
Although it is possible to code rebellions in progress 
for whether the rebels receive shelter and support from 
foreign countries (H3b, Hlof), the potential availability 
of these aids to rebel strength is difficult to observe 
prior to the onset of fighting. In two special cases, the 
potential availability of support from a foreign power 
to governments is observable-in Soviet policy (the 
"Brezhnev doctrine") in Eastern Europe and French 
policy with regard to its former colonies in subSaharan 
Africa.22 We would expect such support to increase the 
relative advantage of government forces against po- 
tential insurgents and thus associate with lower rates 
of civil war onset. We also consider a more tenuous 
measure of potential support to rebels-the number 
of civil wars ongoing in neighboring countries-which 
might yield more easily available weapons, training, or 
the presence of experienced guerrillas.23 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our central hypotheses concern the relationship be- 
tween ethnic and religious diversity or structure, on 
the one hand, and the susceptibility of a country to civil 
war, on the other. Several multivariate analyses of the 
country-year data are presented below, but the main 
story emerging from them is made clear by the contour 
plot in Figure 2. 
Are More Diverse Countries Prone 
to Civil War? 
Figure 2 shows how probabilities of civil war onset 
vary at different percentiles for country income (on the 
x axis, measured in lagged 1985 dollars) and ethnic 
homogeneity (on the y axis, measured by the popu- 
lation share of the largest ethnic group). The lines in 
the plot show the probability of war onset in the next 
five years for a country at the given level of income 
and ethnic homogeneity. For example, countries at the 
twentieth percentile in terms of the size of their largest 
ethnic group-thus quite ethnically diverse-but at the 
eightieth percentile on income have had about a 5% 
21 Using the Phase III Minorities at Risk (MAR) data, Fearon and 
Laitin (1999) found that groups without a rural base area were far less 
likely to be engaged in violent conflict with the state, even after con- 
trolling for various country- and group-specific factors. Toft (1996) 
was the first to note and examine the strong bivariate relationship in 
the MAR data. 
22 U.S. support to rightist regimes in Latin America during the Cold 
War might also qualify, although this was perhaps more offset by 
support for armed insurgency in this area from the Soviet Union and 
Cuba. 
23 The presence of valuable minerals or the suitability of land for 
the cultivation of narcotics is also codable in principle, but at present 
we lack such measures (H10e). Nor do we have measures for the 
comparative disadvantage of governments in access to village-level 
information (Hs). 
chance of civil war outbreak in the next five years. In 
contrast, countries at the eightieth percentile on ethnic 
homogeneity and at the twentieth percentile on income 
had a 15% chance of war in the next five years.24 
Note that for any level of ethnic diversity, as one 
moves up the income scale (to the right in Figure 2), 
the odds of civil war decrease, by substantial factors 
in all cases and dramatically among the most homoge- 
neous countries. The richest fifth is practically immune 
regardless of ethnic composition. In contrast, for given 
levels of country income, no consistent effect is associ- 
ated with variation in ethnic homogeneity (i.e., moving 
up or down the figure). Among the poorest countries 
where we observe the highest rates of civil war, the data 
indicate a tendency for more homogeneous countries to 
be more civil war-prone. Among the richest countries 
there may be a weak tendency for the most homoge- 
neous countries to have fewer civil wars, but the size of 
the effect, if any, is small. 
The empirical pattern is thus inconsistent with H1, 
the common expectation that ethnic diversity is a major 
and direct cause of civil violence. Nor is there strong 
evidence in favor of H2, which expects ethnic strife to 
be activated as modernization advances. Ethnic diver- 
sity could still cause civil war indirectly, if it causes a 
low per capita income (Easterly and Levine 1997) or 
a weak state. But then the mechanisms that actually 
produce the violence would more likely be those of the 
insurgency perspective than the culturalist arguments 
in either perennialist or modernist forms. 
The data for Figure 2 omit the anticolonial wars, and 
the analysis does not control for other possible influ- 
ences on civil strife enumerated earlier. We consider 
these issues next. 
Multivariate Results 
We coded a variable onset as "1" for all country-years 
in which a civil war started and "0" for all others.25 
Model 1 in Table 1 shows the results of a logit analysis 
using onset as the dependent variable and a fairly full 
specification of independent variables discussed above. 
Prior war is a control variable indexing whether the 
24 The figure was produced using R's locfit package, with a smoothing 
parameter of 0.9, and transforming annual probabilities of outbreak 
to five-year equivalents. The figure looks highly similar if we use other 
measures of ethnic diversity, such as fractionalization. 
25 We do not code as ones years in which a civil war continues, which 
would be relevant if our focus were causes of war duration rather 
than onset. Nor do we drop country-years that have an ongoing 
war (as in Collier and Hoeffler 2001), since this would omit the 
14 wars in our data that start while another war is in progress. Other 
approaches to the dependent variable and estimation-such as mak- 
ing the dependent variable "1" for all war years and using dynamic 
probit or Poisson models that interact independent variables with a 
lagged dependent variable (Jackman 2001; Przeworski et al. 2001)- 
produce virtually identical results. Only one country-year in the data 
has more than one onset (Soviet Union 1946, with one Ukrainian 
and three Baltic rebellions). We treat this as a one in the analyses 
reported here, though there are no significant changes if we use 
Poisson regression instead (treating the dependent variable as a 
count) or weight this observation four times in the logit likelihood. 
Using "rare events logit" (King and Zeng 2001) had no appreciable 
impact on any estimates reported. 
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FIGURE 2. Probability of Civil War Onset per Five-Year Period 
GDP/capita in lagged 1985 U.S. dollars 
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country had a distinct civil war ongoing in the previous 
year.26 
Per Capita Income. Per capita income (measured as 
thousands of 1985 U.S. dollars and lagged one year) is 
strongly significant in both a statistical and a substantive 
sense: $1,000 less in per capita income is associated with 
41% greater annual odds of civil war onset, on average. 
Holding other variables at their median values, a coun- 
try in the tenth percentile on income has an 18% chance 
of a civil war outbreak over a decade, compared to an 
11% chance for a country at the median income and 
a 1% chance for a country at the ninetieth percentile 
($573, $1,995, and $9,505, respectively). The income 
variable is not just a proxy for "the West," whose states 
26 With onset as the dependent variable, the data are grouped dura- 
tion data and we need to consider the possibility of temporal depen- 
dence between observations. One approach is dynamic probit; see 
footnote 25. We also tried Beck et al.'s (1998) method of including 
dummies for each successive "peace year" prior to an onset, or fitting 
natural cubic splines. This had no appreciable effect on the estimates, 
and the splines were jointly insignificant. 
might have low rates of civil war for reasons of culture 
or history that have little to do with income. The esti- 
mated coefficient drops only to -0.28 when a dummy 
for the West is included and remains strongly significant 
despite the high correlation between the two variables. 
The relationship holds even within the poorest regions. 
Among the (mainly) former colonies of Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia, we estimate that $1,000 less 
in income corresponds to 34% greater annual odds of 
outbreak.27 
Ethnic and Religious Composition. The estimates 
for the effect of ethnic and religiousfractionalization are 
substantively and statistically insignificant. Alternative 
measures of ethnic and religious diversity-such as the 
27 Contrary to Hibbs 1973 and Hegre et al. 2001, adding the square of 
per capita income does not significantly improve the fit of the model. 
Regarding H2, the interaction of income and ELF has the expected 
sign but is not significant. For lack of space, we report the details of 
these and other "nonresults" mentioned below in the tables included 
in Fearon and Laitin 2003. 
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TABLE 1. Logit Analyses of Determinants of Civil War Onset, 1945-99 
Model 
(4) (5) 
(1) (2) (3) Civil War Civil War 
Civil War "Ethnic" War Civil War (Plus Empires) (COW) 
Prior war -0.954** -0.849* -0.916** -0.688** -0.551 
(0.314) (0.388) (0.312) (0.264) (0.374) 
Per capita incomeab -0.344*** -0.379*** -0.318*** -0.305*** -0.309** 
(0.072) (0.100) (0.071) (0.063) (0.079) 
log(population)ab 0.263*** 0.389*** 0.272*** 0.267*** 0.223** 
(0.073) (0.110) (0.074) (0.069) (0.079) 
log(% mountainous) 0.219** 0.120 0.199* 0.192* 0.418*** 
(0.085) (0.106) (0.085) (0.082) (0.103) 
Noncontiguous state 0.443 0.481 0.426 0.798** -0.171 
(0.274) (0.398) (0.272) (0.241) (0.328) 
Oil exporter 0.858** 0.809* 0.751** 0.548* 1.269*** 
(0.279) (0.352) (0.278) (0.262) (0.297) 
New state 1.709*** 1.777*** 1.658*** 1.523*** 1.147** 
(0.339) (0.415) (0.342) (0.332) (0.413) 
Instabilitya 0.618** 0.385 0.513* 0.548* 0.584* 
(0.235) (0.316) (0.242) (0.225) (0.268) 
Democracya,c 0.021 0.013 
(0.017) (0.022) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.166 0.146 0.164 0.490 -0.119 
(0.373) (0.584) (0.368) (0.345) (0.396) 
Religious fractionalization 0.285 1.533* 0.326 1.176* 
(0.509) (0.724) (0.506) (0.563) 
Anocracya 0.521 * 0.597* 
(0.237) (0.261) 
Democracya.d 0.127 0.219 
(0.304) (0.354) 
Constant -6.731*** -8.450*** -7.019*** -6.801*** -7.503*** 
(0.736) (1.092) (0.751) (0.681) (0.854) 
N 6327 5186 6327 6360 5378 
Note: The dependent variable is coded "1" for country years in which a civil war began and "0" in all others. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 7.0. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
a Lagged one year. 
bIn 1000's. 
c Polity IV; varies from -10 to 10. 
d Dichotomous. 
proportion of the largest group and the log of the num- 
ber of languages spoken by at least 1%-prove to be 
just as unrelated. The ethnic diversity measures show 
a strong bivariate relationship with civil war onset (not 
so for the religion measures), but this evaporates when 
we control for income.28 
Nor are countries that are ethnically or religiously 
polarized in the sense of H3 more likely to experience 
major civil violence. When we add dummy variables for 
countries that have an ethnic or religious majority and 
a minority of at least 8% of the country's population, 
both are incorrectly signed and neither comes close to 
statistical significance. This finding does not depend on 
which other variables are included in the model. 
Ethnic War. The strong effect of per capita income re- 
mains even when we restrict attention to "ethnic wars," 
28 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) find the interaction of ethnic and reli- 
gious fractionalization to be negatively related to onset. Others find 
that fractionalization has a nonmonotonic relation to conflict. Nei- 
ther relationship appears in these data; we suspect that one reason 
may be listwise deletion on missing economic data in other data sets. 
while evidence of an independent effect of cultural di- 
versity is surprisingly weak. In Model 2 (Table 1), the 
dependent variable marks the onset of wars that we 
coded as "ethnic" or partially "ethnic," and we consider 
only countries with at least a 5% ethnic minority. The 
coefficient for ethnic fractionalization barely changes. 
The same is true for our other measures of ethnic diver- 
sity. Our two measures for religious diversity give weak 
and inconsistent results, and support for H7 diminishes 
further if we code the "partially" or "ambiguously" eth- 
nic wars as nonethnic.29 
Democracy and Civil Liberties. Broad social and po- 
litical grievances should be lower, on average, in politi- 
cal democracies. But contrary to H4 and consistent with 
H11, civil war onsets are no less frequent in democracies 
after controlling for income, as shown by the positive 
and statistically insignificant coefficient for democracy, 
29 Coefficients for political instability and mountains diminish in 
this subsample, partly because the associations appear to have been 
weaker for ethnic wars and partly due to the omission of highly ho- 
mogeneous countries. 
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the (lagged) Polity IV measure. The results are the same 
if we use Przeworski et al.'s dichotomous measure in- 
stead (available for 1950-91) or the lag of Freedom 
House's measure of observance of civil liberties (avail- 
able for 1972-99). In the former case the sign is 
"wrong," while in the latter the sign is consistent with 
H4 but the coefficient on civil liberties is thoroughly 
insignificant. 
Some past studies of civil strife found an "inverted- 
U" relationship with democracy and sought to explain 
this by the observation that the most autocratic regimes 
can repress dissent and thus avoid civil violence despite 
facing the highest levels of popular grievance (Hegre 
et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). This observation 
does not explain why the leaders of a partially demo- 
cratic regime are not able to implement full autocracy 
or democracy to avoid conflict and opposition. As sug- 
gested in H1oc, we suspect that the answer is often that 
"anocracies" are weak regimes, lacking the resources 
to be successful autocrats or containing an unstable 
mix of political forces that makes them unable to move 
to crush nascent rebel groups. Consistent with this hy- 
pothesis and with the prior studies, Model 3 (Table 1) 
shows that a dummy variable marking anocracies takes 
a positive coefficient. In substantive terms the estimate 
suggests that these regimes have about 68% greater 
odds of civil war outbreak in any given year than would 
a full autocracy. This is so despite the fact that we are 
controlling for recent political instability, which is much 
more common in anocracies.30 
Linguistic and Religious Discrimination. Added to 
Model 3, our measures of state discrimination against 
regional languages or against minority religions are not 
associated with systematically higher risks of civil war 
onset.31 This nonresult persists when we restrict the 
sample to those countries with at least a 5% religious 
or ethnic minority. 
Inequality. Whether in a bivariate model or added 
to Model 3, the Gini coefficient estimates of income 
inequality do not come close to either statistical or sub- 
stantive significance. The poor quality of the inequality 
data, available for only 108 countries, does not allow 
us to go beyond the claim that there appears to be no 
powerful cross-national relationship between inequal- 
ity and onset, consistent with H1. 
30 In Model 3 Democracy is a dichotomous variable marking regimes 
that scored higher than 5 on the Polity scale; the excluded category is 
autocracies. For Model 3 we followed Polity IV's suggestion in coding 
regime "interruptions" as anocracies; if these values are instead in- 
terpolated, the resulting anocracy indicator gets a smaller estimated 
coefficient that is not quite significant at the 5% level, while that for 
political instability increases. Another issue, raised by Hegre et al. 
(2001), is that the observation of some violence may lead Polity IV 
to code democracies as less "democratic" and autocracies as less 
autocratic (since there is mobilized opposition). So if there is low- 
level violence preceding the reaching of our thresholds, some of the 
effect of "anocracy" may be that it is picking up nascent civil war. 
31 We tried the several religion indicators both separately and as a 
single measure based on a factor analysis of the components. Discrim- 
ination against regional languages is in fact associated with slightly 
lower odds of civil war onset, consistent with Laitin 2000. 
New States and Political Instability. Consistent with 
H1Ja, the odds of civil war onset are estimated as 
5.25 times greater in the first two years of a state's in- 
dependent existence than in other years, a huge effect 
(Model 3). For the "median country," this translates to 
an 11% chance in its first two years. Political instability 
at the center matters in other years as well. The odds 
of onset in a given year are estimated to increase by 
67% if there was instability in governing arrangements 
in any of the previous three years.32 
Mountains and Noncontiguous Territory. Mountain- 
ous terrain is significantly related to higher rates of 
civil war. A country that is about half "mountainous" 
(ninetieth percentile) and otherwise at the median has 
an estimated 13.2% chance of civil war over the course 
of a decade. A similar country that is not mountainous 
at all (tenth percentile) has a 6.5% risk. The estimated 
sign for states with noncontiguous territory is consistent 
with H10e, but its 95% confidence interval includes the 
possibility of no effect.33 
Population. Holding other variables at medians, the 
estimated risk of civil war over the course of a decade 
for a country at the tenth percentile in population is 
6.4%, versus 16.4% for a country at the ninetieth per- 
centile (1.4 versus 56.3 million, e.g., Botswana versus 
Iran). This effect is not due to large states being more 
ethnically diverse. We are controlling for ethnic diver- 
sity, and in any event it turns out that there is essen- 
tially no correlation between diversity measures and 
log of size, even if we omit the relatively homogeneous 
China.34 
Oil, Islam, Young Males. Consistent with H1oh, de- 
riving at least one-third of export revenues from fossil 
fuels is estimated to more than double a country's odds. 
Based on Model 3, the "median country" had a 10% 
chance of civil war over a decade, whereas the same 
country as an oil exporter would have an estimated 
21% chance. 
Oil producers are disproportionately Middle 
Eastern, which raises the question of whether this 
variable might proxy some other relevant attribute of 
these countries. But a dummy for the North Africa/ 
Middle East region is insignificant when added to 
Model 3, while the estimate for oil is barely affected. 
Huntington (1996) argues that "Islam has bloody 
borders" and "bloody innards" because Islamic 
societies have cultural and demographic features that 
make them violence-prone. When we add a variable 
32 Snyder (2000) argues that democratization puts states at greater 
risk for civil war, ethnic in particular. Coding variables for three-or- 
greater moves toward and away from democracy on the Polity index, 
we find in these data that moves away from democracy are much 
more strongly associated with civil war onset in the next year than 
moves toward it, though both forms of instability elevate the risk. 
Hegre et al. (2001) found the same thing using COW civil war data. 
33 Dropping this or other "insignificant" variables from Model 3 
barely affects the remaining estimated coefficients. 
34 Huntington (1996) argues that rapid population growth puts states 
at greater risk for civil war. Using the average growth rate for the 
three prior years, we find no significant impact. 
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measuring the percentage of Muslims in each country 
to our main specification,35 it takes a positive sign but 
is not statistically significant. The effect of oil remains 
strong. 
Huntington also argues that societies with a surfeit of 
young males will be prone to civil violence, suggesting 
this as a part of the explanation for Islam's "bloody 
innards." Given that young males have physical and 
perhaps psychological characteristics that make them 
apt guerrillas, our arguments on insurgency point in the 
same general direction. If we include a lagged measure 
of the proportion of males aged 15 to 24 in the popula- 
tion in Model 3, it has the expected positive sign,36 but 
the estimate is highly uncertain (p = .21); one problem 
is that percentage of young males has a strong negative 
correlation with income, and income gets the better of 
it when both are included. The same is true for male sec- 
ondary schooling rates (cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2001). 
Foreign Support. One determinant of the prospects 
for insurgency is the availability of third-party support 
to either the rebels or the government of the state in 
question. "Availability" is difficult to observe ex ante, 
however. A possible proxy is the number of civil wars 
ongoing in neighboring countries in the previous year, 
which might increase the availability of arms, support, 
and seasoned guerrillas. Adding the lagged version of 
this variable to Model 3, its sign is as predicted, but it 
is not significant (p = .33). Civil war next door is too 
common, occuring in 44% of the country-years in the 
sample. 
Another possible proxy is foreign support to govern- 
ments against domestic challengers. A dummy variable 
for "Soviet bloc" prior to 1991 cannot be included in the 
logit analysis because it perfectly predicts peace. But by 
itself this observation is consistent with our argument.3 
In the late 1980s, Mitterand's government departed 
from long-standing French foreign policy by support- 
ing, to a limited extent, democratization in some of its 
former sub-Saharan colonies. This involved encourag- 
ing "national conferences," elections, and some politi- 
cal opposition, which all suggested that the prior policy 
of immediate military support for French-speaking dic- 
tators might have changed. Civil war rates for for- 
mer French African colonies had been much lower 
than those for other sub-Saharan states. The 25 others 
saw 17 civil war onsets before 1990, a rate of 2.4 per 
100 country-years. The 16 former French colonies had 
only three onsets in the same period, for a rate of 
0.65 per 100 country-years (Chad in 1965, Senegal 
[Casamance] in 1989, and Mali in 1989). If a variable 
marking former French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa 
prior to 1990 is included in Model 3, its estimated co- 
efficient is 
-1.0, which implies an almost-threefold re- 
duction in the annual odds of civil war onset (p = .11; 
35 Coded from the CIA Factbook and a variety of country-specific 
sources. 
36 Data from the World Bank, linearly interpolated for missing years 
within countries. 
37 Foreign support may be at least as important as communist party 
structure in explaining Huntington's (1968) observation that the com- 
munist countries rarely faced insurrections. 
the other estimates remain stable). A dummy variable 
for all former French colonies is unrelated to civil war 
onset, which suggests that the observed effect in sub- 
Saharan Africa is due to the mechanism behind Hlof 
rather than the effects of French colonial administra- 
tion or law. 
Other Variables and Robustness Checks 
Anticolonial Wars. Figure 2 and the multivariate 
analyses above omitted the 13 anticolonial wars in five 
colonial empires (Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, 
and The Netherlands). Including them is problematic 
for both theoretical and empirical reasons, but so is 
ignoring them. The main practical obstacle is the lack 
of comparable data. However, by using the ethnic 
fractionalization, population, mountainousness, and in- 
come data for each colony in its first year of inde- 
pendence, we were able to produce annual estimates 
of these variables for each empire. The income esti- 
mates are systematically too high-we use, for example, 
Nigerian GDP per capita in 1962 as an estimate of its 
income as a British colony in 1945. This creates some 
bias against the income variable and in favor of the ELF, 
which has a median value of 0.83 for the 114 "empire 
years," compared to 0.34 for nonempire years. 
Model 4 reports a logit analysis parallel to our speci- 
fication in Model 1 (Table 1), omitting only the democ- 
racy variable and religious fractionalization (which is 
hard to estimate for the empires due to shared religions 
between colonies and metropoles). Given that the em- 
pires were quite civil war-prone and highly diverse, it 
is not surprising that the estimated coefficient for ELF 
increases. Surprisingly, though, it remains statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, while, excepting nonconti- 
guity, the others change little. Noncontiguous states are 
now estimated to have had 2.2 times the odds of civil 
war in this period, other things being equal. Because the 
empires are all noncontiguous and because noncontigu- 
ity otherwise does a better job than the ELF at picking 
out civil wars onsets, it is given greater substantive and 
statistical significance by the logit. If we drop noncon- 
tiguity, the estimate for ELF increases to 0.62-which 
corresponds to a 59% increase in risk moving from the 
tenth to the ninetieth percentile-but still fails statis- 
tical significance at the 5% level (p = .07). Thus even 
if we include the anticolonial wars, the evidence that 
ethnic diversity directly causes states to be more civil 
war prone remains slim at best.38 
Stepping back from the statistical analysis, we ob- 
serve that these five imperial states managed their 
empires for many years before World War II with 
fairly little active rebellion despite the same levels of 
ethnic fractionalization, noncontiguity, and mountain- 
ousness. Nor did discrimination and oppression sud- 
denly increase in the empires after the war, causing 
38 We created a democracy estimate for the empires by taking a 
weighted average of the metropole's lagged Polity democracy score 
and 
-10, weighting by the metropole's proportion of total imperial 
population. Adding this or dummies for "anocracy" and democracy 
to Model 5 has no substantive impact. 
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anticolonial movements as a response. Rather, the war 
greatly weakened the main imperial states materially, 
and the new international legal order (the U.N. system) 
gave support to anticolonial movements. These shocks 
to the relative power of the metropoles help explain 
"civil war onset" in these cases (Fearon 2001). 
Regional Effects. Different regions of the world 
share a variety of historical, cultural, and economic 
traits. It is reasonable to wonder if any of the variables 
considered in the multivariate analysis just proxy for 
such factors. Further, if regional dummy variables do 
not add to the model's explanatory power, then we 
have managed to account for the influence of regional 
characteristics with our more general independent vari- 
ables. We find that if we add all (but one) regional dum- 
mies to Model 3, the coefficients and significance levels 
for our other variables are little affected. A likelihood- 
ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that "re- 
gions do not matter" beyond the included variables 
(p = .22). Including region dummies individually re- 
veals that none has a rate of civil war onset significantly 
different from what one would expect on the basis 
of the country characteristics already included in the 
model. 
Period and Fixed Effects. If added to Model 3, 
dummy variables marking each decade (but one) are 
jointly significant in a likelihood-ratio test (p= .04), 
showing evidence of a general upward trend in civil war 
risk after the 1940s. Adding a dummy for the 1940s and 
a variable marking the year indicates that from 1950 
the odds of civil war outbreak rose about 2% per year, 
controlling for the other variables. As noted earlier, 
there is no secular trend when we do not control for 
other factors. Part of the explanation is that the median 
of country incomes roughly doubled from 1950 to 1999, 
which "should have"-based on Model 3-reduced the 
onset odds for the "median country" by about 35%. 
The fact that the rate of outbreak remains fairly con- 
stant while incomes generally increased in effect pe- 
nalizes income in Model 3. When year is added, the 
effect estimate for income increases to -0.36 (the other 
effect estimates stay steady, except for noncontiguity, 
which becomes statistically significant at p = .035). We 
do not know what accounts for steady rates of outbreak 
despite increasing incomes. Increased international in- 
equality (so that there is a set of persistently poor coun- 
tries at risk for civil war), greater availability of small 
arms, and diffusion of insurgency "know-how" come to 
mind, but are just conjectures. 
This observation also raises the question of how 
much the estimated impact of income is due to cross- 
country comparisons and how much to increasing 
income within given countries associating with civil 
peace. Applying conditional fixed effects logit to 
Model 3 without the variables that have little or no tem- 
poral variation (mountains, noncontiguity, ethnic and 
religious fractionalization) and with a control for year, 
we find that the estimated coefficient for income drops 
only to -0.24 but is no longer significant (p=.16). 
Using log of income, however, returns the same co- 
efficient that log of income takes in the standard logit 
on the full sample (-0.78), significant at p =.02.39 In 
addition, the effect estimates for the other variables 
are, with one exception, virtually identical to the es- 
timates in the full, "pooled" model, the significance 
remaining high for all but anocracy and oil (which has 
little temporal variation). The exception is population, 
which varies vastly more across countries than within 
them over time. While bigger countries are more civil 
war-prone, there is no evidence that population growth 
within a country raises the risk. 
Primary Commodity Exports. Using an "expanded" 
version of the COW data, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) 
find that the risk of civil war onset is maximized when 
primary commodity exports comprise about 32% of the 
country's GDP, with risk declining on either side of this 
figure. They propose that, up to a point, higher levels 
of primary commodity exports provide more motiva- 
tion and opportunity for rebels to support themselves 
through "looting." Beyond this point, the revenue gains 
available to the state are said to be large enough to 
make civil war less likely. 
We find little evidence of such a relationship in our 
data. Neither the share of primary commodity exports 
in GDP nor its square is remotely significant when 
added to Model 3. 
We agree with the general argument behind Collier 
and Hoeffler's hypothesis. In our terms, insurgency 
should be more feasible if sources of financing are read- 
ily available. But we doubt that primary commodity 
exports are a good measure of financing potential for 
rebels. This measure combines oil, agricultural prod- 
ucts, and metals and minerals, which, except for some 
minerals, are hard to exploit without control of a na- 
tional distribution system and ports. Oil exports may be 
relevant not so much because they finance rebel groups 
but, as we argued, because they mark relative state 
weakness at a given level of income.41 A better measure 
for financing potential would focus on the presence of 
minerals or contraband that can reward control of a 
small enclave with huge profits (Leonard and Strauss 
2001). 
Trade Openness. Using a measure of "state failure" 
that includes both civil war and "disruptive regime tran- 
sitions," Esty et al. (1998) found that trade share of 
GDP strongly predicted civil peace. Using the Penn 
World Tables measure of trade as a share of the GDP, 
we find no such relationship in our data. Trade is related 
to civil peace in a bivariate logit, but this is because 
smaller countries have more trade and less civil war. 
39 Whether we use income or logged income in the standard logit 
makes for no significant differences. 
40 The data series on primary commodity exports begins in 1960 and is 
available only at five-year intervals. We interpolated missing values 
and extended the 1995 values through 1999. We also tried Collier 
and Hoeffler's procedure of grouping the data by five-year periods 
beginning in 1960, again finding no relationship. 
41 Our oil variable is moderately correlated with the primary com- 
modities measure, at r =.46, but the latter and its square remain 
insignificant when oil is dropped from the model. 
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Alternative Definitions and Codingfor "Civil War." 
Our coding rules admit civil conflicts in which at least 
1,000 have been killed. Some might argue that this 
threshold is too low to distinguish properly between 
"civil war" and, say, terrorism. When we recode the 30 
conflicts in our sample estimated to have killed fewer 
than 5,000 as zeros, the results for Model 3 are nearly 
identical.42 
We also checked to see how our results differed if 
we based the coding of civil war onset on the lists 
given by Collier and Hoeffler (2001), the COW project, 
and Doyle and Sambanis (2000). As shown in Model 5 
(Table 1), which bases onset on the COW data (1945- 
92), the coefficients and significance levels for the "in- 
surgency" variables are remarkably stable.43 We obtain 
quite similar results for the other two coding schemes. 
Although these four civil war lists differ on many spe- 
cific start years and, to some extent, on what cases con- 
stitute "civil wars" at all, there proves to be substantial 
shared variation. For example, 53 of the 93 COW civil 
wars in the sample start in the same year as an onset 
in our data, and 68 start within two years of one of our 
onsets. At the country level, the bivariate correlation 
between our estimate of the total number of wars by 
country and the equivalent for the others ranges from 
0.71 with Collier and Hoeffler to 0.82 with Doyle and 
Sambanis. 
CONCLUSION 
The prevalence of internal war in the 1990s is mainly 
the result of an accumulation of protracted conflicts 
since the 1950s rather than a sudden change associated 
with a new, post-Cold War international system. Decol- 
onization from the 1940s through the 1970s gave birth 
to a large number of financially, bureaucratically, and 
militarily weak states. These states have been at risk 
for civil violence for the whole period, almost entirely 
in the form of insurgency, or rural guerrilla warfare. 
Insurgency is a mode of military practice that can be 
harnessed to various political agendas, be it commu- 
nism in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Islamic 
fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Algeria, or Kashmir, 
right-wing "reaction" in Nicaragua, or ethnic national- 
ism in a great many states. The conditions that favor 
insurgency-in particular, state weakness marked by 
poverty, a large population, and instability-are better 
predictors of which countries are at risk for civil war 
than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or 
measures of grievances such as economic inequality, 
lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimina- 
tion against minority religions or languages. 
42 The coefficient on income increases 21%, noncontiguity becomes 
significant, and anocracy weakens slightly. We coded total deaths 
ourselves, based on Brogan 1998, Institute for International and 
Strategic Studies 2000, Sivard 1996, Valentino 2002, and country- 
specific sources. 
43 The one exception is religious fractionalization, which just man- 
ages significance at the 5% level here. This does not occur in the 
other data sets, and even with the COW data the estimate for reli- 
gious fractionalization is highly sensitive to which other variables are 
included in the model. 
How could democracy and cultural or religious ho- 
mogeneity fail to associate with civil peace across coun- 
tries? Viewing "ethnic wars" as a species of insurgency 
may help explain this paradoxical result. If, under the 
right environmental conditions, just 500 to 2,000 ac- 
tive guerrillas can make for a long-running, destruc- 
tive internal war, then the average level of grievance 
in a group may not matter that much. What matters is 
whether active rebels can hide from government forces 
and whether economic opportunities are so poor that 
the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2,000 young 
men. Grievance may favor rebellion by leading nonac- 
tive rebels to help in hiding the active rebels. But all 
the guerrillas really need is superior local knowledge, 
which enables them to threaten reprisal for denun- 
ciation. 
If our analysis is correct, then policy makers should 
not assume that civil wars and the "failed states" they 
sometimes produce are temporary phenomena of the 
immediate post-Cold War world. Nor should policy 
makers or academics infer that ethnic diversity is the 
root cause of civil conflict when they observe insur- 
gents in a poor country who mobilize fighters along 
ethnic lines. Instead, the civil wars of the period have 
structural roots, in the combination of a simple, robust 
military technology and decolonization, which created 
an international system numerically dominated by frag- 
ile states with limited administrative control of their 
peripheries. 
Regarding policy implications, the spread of democ- 
racy and tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities 
should be major foreign policy goals because they are 
desirable for their own sake, but not with the expec- 
tation that they are "magic bullets" for the prevention 
or resolution of civil war. Sometimes recommended as 
a general international policy for resolving ethnic civil 
wars (e.g., Kaufmann 1996), ethnic partitions should be 
viewed as having large international implications and 
high costs. International support for partition would 
increase the expected benefits for rebels, who, we have 
argued, may be able to get a nasty civil war going on 
the basis of small numbers when the conditions for in- 
surgency are right. 
Policies to redress grievances, or, in the limit, parti- 
tion, could be important to resolve ongoing conflicts. 
We cannot say on the basis of this research, which fo- 
cused on civil war onset rather than termination. We 
find little evidence that civil war is predicted by large 
cultural divisions or broadly held grievances. But it 
seems quite clear that intense grievances are produced 
by civil war-indeed, this is often a central objective 
of rebel strategy. These could well pose obstacles to 
settlement. 
Regarding prevention, our analysis suggests that 
while economic growth may correlate with fewer civil 
wars, the causal mechanism is more likely a well- 
financed and administratively competent government. 
In specific terms, international and nongovernmen- 
tal organizations should develop programs that im- 
prove legal accountability within developing world 
militaries and police, and make aid to governments 
fighting civil wars conditional on the state observing 
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counterinsurgency practices that do not help rebels re- 
cruit militias. Governments that follow horrible, war- 
perpetuating counterinsurgency practices or are so cor- 
rupt as to be hopeless should be left on their own or, 
when there are major implications for regional stability 
or international terrorism, be viewed as candidates for 
"neotrusteeship" under the United Nations or regional 
military and political organizations such as NATO and 
the European Union. The latter system, which we al- 
ready see operating, in effect, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
East Timor, should be rationalized so as to improve 
internal coordination among the many players involved 
in such operations. 
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